North Korea, observing the U.S. airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, is expected to focus more on enhancing its nuclear production and capabilities, particularly its counterattack capability. Analysts predict this shift as Pyongyang anticipates similar scenarios potentially unfolding for them in the future.
On Sunday, the U.S. launched attacks on three Iranian nuclear facilities – Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan – using GBU-57 bunker buster missiles. This marked the first U.S. military strike on Iranian soil since the Islamic Republic’s establishment in 1979.
The precision and covert nature of the U.S. operation against Iran’s nuclear sites have led to speculation that Washington may have already developed similar strike plans for North Korea’s nuclear facilities.
North Korea’s primary nuclear development site is located in Nyongbyon County, housing various nuclear material production facilities, including a 5MWe reactor. A second nuclear hub near Pyongyang, in the Kangson area, is believed to have facilities for producing highly enriched uranium (HEU). Multiple missile production bases are thought to be scattered across the country.
Experts point to Iran’s lack of nuclear weapons as a key factor enabling the U.S. airstrikes. The absence of a nuclear deterrent limited Iran’s retaliatory options against U.S. assets or regional allies like Israel.
However, most analysts believe the U.S. would be unable to execute a similar operation against North Korea. Pyongyang’s existing nuclear arsenal poses a significant risk, as it could potentially retaliate against the U.S. mainland or launch nuclear strikes on U.S. allies like South Korea and Japan.
North Korea, having conducted six nuclear tests, is estimated to possess up to 50 nuclear warheads. Intelligence suggests it also has substantial atomic material for the rapid production of additional warheads.
There’s a possibility that North Korea operates covert facilities undetected by U.S. and South Korean intelligence. This uncertainty means that Washington and Seoul cannot guarantee the complete neutralization of North Korea’s nuclear counterattack capabilities.
Observing Iran’s situation, North Korea is likely making similar strategic calculations. Experts anticipate that Pyongyang will accelerate nuclear weapons production, deployment, and focus on enhancing its counterattack capabilities.
North Korea’s potential for preemptive strikes is another area of concern. In September 2022, North Korea adopted a law permitting preemptive nuclear weapon use based on perceived enemy threats. This policy shift suggests an increased willingness to consider first-use options during heightened tensions.
As North Korea advances its nuclear capabilities, the viability of denuclearization-based negotiation strategies diminishes. Some analysts argue that the concept of North Korean denuclearization may no longer be relevant.
North Korea’s distrust of the U.S. is expected to deepen following the airstrikes on Iran amid ongoing nuclear talks. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, having witnessed the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) in 2018 and the collapse of the 2019 Hanoi summit, may no longer view the U.S. as a credible negotiating partner.
Professor Lim Eul Chul of Kyungnam University’s Institute for Far Eastern Studies predicts that North Korea will likely double down on its existing policy, prioritizing regime survival and nuclear development. We can expect Pyongyang to strengthen its anti-Western alliances, particularly through military cooperation with Russia and China, while becoming increasingly skeptical of dialogue with South Korea and negotiations with the United States.