North Korea has redefined its maritime domain as a core strategic space, integrating survival tactics and foreign policy. Analysts suggest this shift could lead to a North Korean version of the Indo-Pacific strategy, one that leverages long-term alliances with China and Russia.
In a report titled “Changes in North Korea’s Maritime Strategy: The Potential for Developing a North Korean Version of the Indo-Pacific Strategy,” researchers Yang Wook and Seo Bo Bae from the Asan Institute for Policy Studies said on Tuesday that Pyongyang has begun to view the ocean as a multifaceted strategic arena for survival and development, capitalizing on the strategic flexibility gained through its strengthened ties with Moscow.
The report highlights that since the 2020s, North Korea has ramped up production of large surface vessels and submarines, bolstering its naval capabilities beyond coastal defense to potentially project power into open waters. Pyongyang’s emphasis on maritime sovereignty and deep-sea operational capabilities, along with its challenge to the Northern Limit Line in the Yellow Sea through the concept of intermediate boundary waters, signals a clear intent to disrupt the existing maritime order.
This strategic pivot is seen as part of a broader structural shift. North Korea’s maritime strategy now embodies a dual approach: a short-term survival tactic to circumvent sanctions and economic isolation, and a long-term development strategy aimed at expanding influence through nuclear capabilities, international partnerships, and maritime economic ventures.
In the immediate term, North Korea is exploiting maritime avenues to evade sanctions through illicit transshipments, fishing rights sales, and vessel disguise tactics. These activities serve as crucial sources of foreign currency. At the same time, Pyongyang is fostering maritime exchanges with Beijing and Moscow, viewing the ocean as a vital conduit for economic recovery and regime stability.
Looking ahead, the report says North Korea clearly intends to leverage its maritime domain as a strategic platform for nuclear operations. Recent developments, including submarine-launched ballistic missile tests, the unveiling of a 5,000-ton destroyer, and rhetoric about deep-sea capabilities, are interpreted as calculated moves to establish second-strike potential and facilitate gray-zone provocations. The report warns that if North Korea succeeds in expanding its nuclear operations into maritime and underwater domains, it could significantly escalate its strategic threat profile.
In response to these developments, the report urges a comprehensive overhaul of South Korea’s maritime security strategy. It calls for enhanced cooperation between the Navy and the Coast Guard to achieve superiority in marine surveillance. It recommends institutionalizing trilateral maritime security cooperation with the United States and Japan, particularly in missile defense and anti-submarine warfare.
To counter the long-term possibility that North Korea’s maritime strategy could become a cornerstone of a North Korea–China–Russia alignment, the report suggests that South Korea elevate the importance of maritime security and the preservation of international order within its Indo-Pacific strategy. It also recommends greater participation in multilateral maritime security forums, emphasizing the need for South Korea to more actively integrate its maritime strategic identity into its broader national security and development strategies.