Kim Jong Un’s attendance at the 80th anniversary celebration of China’s Victory Day on September 3 was not only aimed at restoring North Korea-China relations but also intended to urge Russia’s active support for North Korea and create internal conflicts within South Korean society, according to an analysis released on Tuesday.
This assessment was presented in a report titled, Kim Jong Un’s Attendance at China’s Victory Day and Future Prospects for North Korea-China-Russia Relations, by Cha Du-hyeogn, vice president of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, and Lee Dong-kyu, a research fellow.
The report primarily attributed Kim’s attendance to the goal of mending the previously strained North Korea-China relationship. Despite North Korea’s recent focus on its ties with Russia, China remains its most crucial ally, accounting for up to 90 percent of North Korea’s trade volume.
The analysis also suggested that Kim’s unprecedented decision to participate in a multilateral event was likely aimed at pressuring Russia for increased military and economic support. While Russia has presumably been providing various compensatory measures since North Korea dispatched a large number of combat troops to Russia last October, the level of support may not meet North Korea’s expectations.
Notably, the report highlighted the lack of visible progress in North Korea’s military reconnaissance satellite development, which was expected to benefit from extensive Russian support. This absence of achievements could indicate insufficient military assistance from Russia.
Following the successful launch of Malligyong-1 in November 2023, North Korea had announced plans to launch three additional reconnaissance satellites last year. However, after a failed launch attempt in May, there have been no further developments in military reconnaissance satellite launches.
The report also interpreted North Korea’s decision to attend the Victory Day celebration as a strategic move to provoke debate within South Korean society regarding its North Korea policy. By strengthening diplomatic ties with China and Russia immediately after recent South Korea-Japan and South Korea-U.S. summits, North Korea likely hoped to generate public sentiment in South Korea advocating for restraint in the South Korea-U.S. alliance and South Korea-U.S.-Japan security cooperation.
Additionally, the report suggested that Kim’s visit to China aimed to enhance cooperation with China and Russia in order to gain leverage in future North Korea-U.S. negotiations. It also served to showcase his status as a strategic national leader to the domestic population ahead of the 80th anniversary of the Workers’ Party and the 9th Workers’ Party Congress.
From China’s perspective, the report noted that strengthening the North Korea-China-Russia framework serves to counter U.S. influence. It also allows China to enhance its own standing in anticipation of potential North Korea-U.S. dialogue, preventing it from being sidelined in regional affairs.
The report observed that while Kim, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and Russian President Vladimir Putin utilized the Victory Day celebration to demonstrate their close relationships, the differing goals and circumstances among the three countries make it challenging to maintain a consistent trilateral framework.
Importantly, China seeks to avoid the perception of militarily supporting North Korea and Russia in the international community. The report also noted diverging interests between North Korea and Russia, with North Korea seeking nuclear technology and conventional military modernization, while Russia aims to expand its advanced weapons supply capabilities following the Ukraine conflict.
In conclusion, the report advised the South Korean government to maintain the momentum of its alliance with the U.S. and trilateral cooperation with the U.S. and Japan, while closely monitoring the bilateral relations between North Korea and China, North Korea and Russia, as well as China and Russia, rather than focusing solely on the North Korea-China-Russia dynamic.
