While China’s active role in mediating the resumption of dialogue between North and South Korea, as well as between North Korea and the U.S., remains limited, analysts suggest that a gray area exists outside the sanctions framework. This area allows for restricted economic and human exchanges between North Korea and China, facilitating minimal strategic communication and management.
Professor Park Jong-cheol from Gyeongsang National University shared this assessment during the 2026 Unification Policy Forum held at the National Assembly Library in Washington D.C. on Thursday. He stated that the situation is realistically challenging, noting that sanctions have also limited the Chinese government’s influence over North Korea.
Professor Park identified the ongoing United Nations (UN) Security Council sanctions against North Korea as a structural constraint for China. Despite Russia’s stance weakening the effectiveness of these sanctions, China continues to submit reports on sanctions enforcement, emphasizing compliance with the resolutions.
However, he noted that China maintains strategic communication and management channels with North Korea by permitting certain unofficial exchanges within the gray area of sanctions.
Specific examples include: the influx of about 8,000 registered private vehicles and heavy equipment into Pyongyang, training programs for hundreds of North Korean agricultural technicians in Northeast China, approximately 300 cargo trucks and one freight train traveling daily from Dandong, China, to Sinuiju, North Korea, and limited human and material exchanges via air travel. The route through which luxury goods and perfumes enter high-end department stores in Pyongyang was also mentioned as part of these gray area exchanges.
Professor Park explained that these exchanges are far from a complete lifting of sanctions or normalization of relations. Rather, they represent China’s strategic choice to maintain some level of communication with North Korea.
Additionally, he predicted that during President Lee Jae Myung’s term, the vision of peaceful coexistence and mutual growth would drive Korea-China cooperation, but structural conflicts could lead to significant fluctuations in the relationship.
He observed that while the Korea-China relationship is influenced by the structural constraints of U.S.-China relations, which act as a centrifugal force, President Lee’s vision of peaceful coexistence and mutual growth serves as a strong centripetal force in Korea-China relations.
However, Professor Park cautioned that factors such as the Taiwan issue, North Korea’s nuclear program and sanctions, and U.S.-China technological competition and industrial standards conflicts could potentially destabilize relations. He suggested that future Korea-China relations are likely to experience various fluctuations, marked by a mix of cooperation and confrontation on different issues.
He concluded by stating that the diplomatic and security strategy of peaceful coexistence and mutual growth, coupled with a pragmatic approach based on national interests, will likely exert a stronger centripetal force during President Lee’s term than the centrifugal forces pulling in the opposite direction. This suggests that Korea-China relations will likely move towards cooperation within managed competition.
