North Korea has implemented a major personnel overhaul through its 9th Workers’ Party Congress. The total replacement rate for Central Committee members and candidate members reached 51.6%, with significant changes in cabinet deputy prime ministers and ministerial-level positions, suggesting a strong emphasis on accountability in the economic sector.
According to the 9th Central Committee roster released on Monday, there are 139 members, including 66 retaining their positions, 19 promotions, and 54 new appointments. The combined number of new and promoted members is 73, resulting in a member replacement rate of approximately 52.5%.
There are 111 candidate members, with 23 retaining their positions, 3 demotions, and 85 new appointments. The high proportion of new members at 76.6% highlights a more pronounced shake-up among the next generation of potential elites.
In total, the replacement rate for both members and candidate members exceeds 50%, marking an exceptionally high level of personnel renewal compared to recent party congresses.
Hong Min, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification, noted that while over half of the committee members were replaced, the most striking feature was the extensive change of over 70% among candidate members. He analyzed this as a strategy to maintain core loyalists in top positions while boldly replacing working-level staff to ensure momentum and maintain tension for the 9th term.
The failure of many 8th-term candidate members to retain their positions or gain promotions demonstrates the spread of a performance-based personnel policy that readily replaces those who fail to deliver results.
A notable change in this reshuffle is the extensive overhaul of the cabinet’s economic team. The list of those removed reportedly includes about ten deputy prime ministers and ministers responsible for key industries.
Regarding the widespread replacement of leaders in major industries such as coal, shipbuilding, fisheries, land and sea transport, and chemicals, Hong suggested that this strongly reflects accountability for the limitations and underperformance in implementing the 8th Five-Year Economic Development Plan. He interpreted this personnel renewal as an attempt to secure momentum for the 9th term.
There’s speculation that the regime has replaced bureaucrats entrenched in old habits with new, practical figures to accelerate Kim Jong Un’s priority projects, such as the Local Development 20×10 policy and regional balanced development initiatives.
Professor Lim Eul-chul from Kyungnam University’s Institute for Far Eastern Studies characterized this reshuffle as a two-track expertise enhancement, maintaining stability in defense while bringing economic and construction professionals to the forefront. He assessed the new personnel structure as indicative of aggressive resource allocation aimed at completing the new five-year plan and revitalizing local economies.
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The political symbolism is significant, as the absence of veteran figures such as Choe Ryong-hae, Ri Pyong-chol, and Pak Jong-chon from the Central Committee list signals a generational shift.
Professor Lim interpreted Choe’s omission as a move to eliminate symbols of the second generation of guerrilla fighters and elevate Kim’s unique leadership system to its final stage, demonstrating that his regime has solidified without relying on the legacy of his predecessors.
The exit of military figures like Ri and Pak suggests that the physical goals of the five-year defense development plan have been partially achieved, indicating a transition from an era of development to one of operation through generational change.
Hong noted that this party congress aligns with the narrative of formalizing a new era that surpasses previous leadership. He emphasized that the restructuring is centered around practical loyalists rather than bloodline or senior symbolic figures.
Experts view the personnel changes at the 9th Party Congress not merely as a reshuffle but as a structural reorganization that combines four key trends: strengthening Kim’s sole leadership system, accountability for economic failures, a significant influx of next-generation elites, and the exit of senior symbolic figures.
Ultimately, this reshuffle reflects an internal reset of the regime aimed at solidifying the Kim era and ensuring momentum for the 9th term’s policy initiatives.