North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has prioritized military activities over civilian affairs in the first half of this year. As the regime gears up for a major political event on October 10, marking the 80th anniversary of the Workers’ Party’s founding, Kim has focused on bolstering military capabilities rather than addressing public concerns. Analysts suggest this strategy emphasizes upgrading conventional weapons and intensifying military drills.
On July 25, Han Ki-bum, a visiting senior research fellow at The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, released a report titled, Assessment of North Korea’s Situation in the First Half of 2025 Based on Kim Jong Un’s Public Activities. The report reveals that out of Kim’s 51 public appearances from January to June, 24 (47%) were military-related, while only 13 (25%) focused on economic matters. Han noted that while this trend is consistent with last year, the emphasis on military affairs has been particularly pronounced in 2025.
The report details Kim’s military-centric agenda, beginning with his observation of a hypersonic missile launch and visit to a nuclear material production site in January. From March to May, he concentrated on modernizing conventional forces by inspecting tank factories, drone development facilities, and special forces training centers. Kim declared 2025 the Year of Training, consistently advocating for military exercises aligned with modern warfare tactics.
Han observed that since President Donald Trump’s tenure, Kim has modulated threats against the U.S. while strengthening ties with Russia to enhance conventional weapons. He pointed out that the expansion of artillery production and the development of indigenous strategic weapon systems like drones and anti-aircraft missiles appear to be rooted in technological cooperation with Russia.
In the economic sphere, all 13 of Kim’s activities were visits to construction sites. Han noted that Kim’s remark on just attending groundbreaking and completion ceremonies is exhausting, reflecting his focus on showcasing new hospitals, residential complexes, and tourist zones. Han further added that notable absences were inspections of civilian factories or the leadership of economic meetings.
Regarding North Korea’s outlook for the latter half of the year, Han projected that it anticipates large-scale military parades, weapons exhibitions, and mass gymnastics displays in preparation for the 9th Workers’ Party Congress and the 80th anniversary celebrations. There’s also a possibility of a military reconnaissance satellite launch just before the parade. He added that Kim’s visit to Russia and potential additional troop deployments would likely strengthen North Korea-Russia relations.
Han concluded that Kim’s first-half activities clearly indicate North Korea’s intention to highlight the parallel development of nuclear and conventional forces over economic achievements. He added that the South Korean government should focus on bolstering its response capabilities in light of the qualitative shifts in North Korea’s military power. Emphasizing that any dialogue or pragmatic diplomacy with North Korea should be pursued within the framework of U.S.-Japan-South Korea cooperation.