Amid the recent strengthening ties between North Korea and Russia, various interpretations have been raised concerning the backdrop of Chinese President Xi Jinping reiterating his country’s fundamental principles of foreign relations such as opposition to the participation of small groups.
At the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on the morning of the 28th, Xi addressed the 70th Anniversary of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence event, where he mentioned the Korean Peninsula issue alongside the Ukraine crisis, the Israel-Palestine conflict, Iran, Myanmar, and Afghanistan, stating that “China is playing a constructive role.”
Xi specifically emphasized, “We must realize the wish for peace by opposing confrontation between camps, construction of small groups, and forced siding, together with other countries.”
This is seen as a reconfirmation of the dual suspension (simultaneous suspension of North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests and U.S.-South Korea military exercises) and dual-track (simultaneous promotion of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and transition to a peace regime), which China has been advocating as a solution to the issue of the Korean Peninsula.
Furthermore, his remarks about factional confrontations and the formation of small cliques are primarily aimed at Western countries, especially the United States. The Biden administration is transitioning its diplomatic strategy from the spoked wheel structure, which has been building numerous bilateral alliances centered around the United States, to a lattice-like structure focused on multilateral cooperation bodies.
This signifies a tighter containment of China, with the multilateral cooperation bodies pursued by the United States including not only the Quad (security cooperation body of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India) and AUKUS (the military alliance of the United States, U.K., and Australia) but also U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral cooperation.
The Biden administration has also been pushing for a change in the role of alliances from protecting allies to projecting power together to achieve strategic goals and a shift in alliance policy principles.
Amidst all this, China has been expressing its opposition to the anti-China, repression of China, and the formation of small cliques.
In this context, Xi’s recent remarks are not entirely new. However, considering the recent declaration of the restoration of the military alliance between North Korea and Russia, some interpret this as a clear declaration by China that it will not participate in the close triangular relationship between North Korea, China, and Russia.
An international expert, who requested anonymity, analyzed, “China is reluctant to be tied together with North Korea and Russia,” adding, “They have put forth their diplomatic principles this time primarily targeting the United States, but they also provided a pretext to distance themselves from North Korea and Russia.”
It is analyzed that China will continue to avoid being tied to the close structure of North Korea, China, and Russia in the situation where China is focusing on management diplomacy against the United States until the U.S. presidential election in November.
Meanwhile, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, to be held in Laos at the end of July, is considered a barometer for gauging the prospects of North Korea-Russia-China trilateral cooperation. The ARF is the only multilateral security consultation body that North Korea participates in, with a total of 27 countries including the 10 ASEAN countries, the United States, Japan, South Korea, China, and Russia.
Currently, the diplomatic circles are paying attention to whether North Korean Foreign Affairs Minister Choe Son Hui will attend this meeting. This is because the ARF stage is a strategic opportunity for North Korea and Russia to present the possibility of North Korea-China-Russia trilateral cooperation to the international community.
