On Wednesday, the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) released a report titled “North Korea’s Principles of Hostile Struggle and Defense Development Plans: Focusing on Nuclear Strategy and Foreign Policy.” The report argues that North Korea’s emphasis on nuclear weapons development and hostile struggle approach are deeply interconnected, with the two policies reinforcing each other to strengthen Pyongyang’s strategic position.
The study outlines how North Korea’s principle of hostile struggle is evident in the country’s advancing nuclear strategy and defense development. The term “hostile” first appeared in North Korean rhetoric during Kim Jong Un’s 2014 speech, in which he did not specify a particular adversary.
Although this hostile rhetoric diminished during the 2018 inter-Korean and U.S.-North Korea dialogues, it reemerged in 2022 when the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party announced a new principle of hostile actions, which includes the potential use of tactical nuclear weapons.
The report further explains that before Kim Jong Un’s leadership, the concept of hostility was used to navigate inter-Korean relations strategically amid North Korea’s economic challenges and international isolation. Today, however, this rhetoric operates in a significantly altered strategic environment—one marked by clear national goals, the tangible presence of nuclear weapons, and a shifting multipolar global order that allows North Korea to enhance its defense capabilities.
In this context, the report emphasizes that understanding North Korea’s nuclear strategy and defense development plans is crucial for fully grasping the hostile struggle it projects, not only toward South Korea but also the United States.
The report argues that North Korea’s theory of two hostile states—its view of the U.S. and South Korea as adversaries—is not merely about stoking emotional or military confrontation with Seoul. Instead, it reflects a calculated strategic choice central to Pyongyang’s long-term goals.
North Korea’s new policy of recognizing South Korea as a state can be seen as part of a broader effort to create flexible conditions for the potential use of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula, thereby strengthening its deterrence against external threats, including the U.S.
Since 2019, North Korea’s deployment of operational nuclear weapons has exposed contradictions within its longstanding unification front logic, which was previously based on the idea of a unified Korean people. This shift has forced Pyongyang to recalibrate its approach to South Korea.
The analysis concludes that by removing ethnic considerations from its nuclear strategy, North Korea likely sees South Korea as a bargaining chip, which could serve as a potent tool not only in negotiations with the South but also in deterring U.S. influence in the region.
