On Tuesday, military analysts raised concerns about the practical limitations of South Korea’s potential nuclear armament in deterring North Korean provocations. They argue that domestic nuclear armament discussions primarily generate diplomatic costs with the international community, including the U.S., while offering minimal security benefits.
Professors Im Bum-chul from Kyungnam University’s Institute for Far Eastern Studies and Lee Jong-eun from North Greenville University co-authored a paper titled, Opening Pandora’s Box: Is South Korea’s Nuclear Armament Feasible and Desirable? The study was recently published in the Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI) ranked international journal Pacific Focus, issued by Inha University’s Center for International Studies.
The paper notes that since Donald Trump’s re-inauguration on January 20, his statements seemingly recognizing North Korea’s nuclear status have amplified calls for nuclear armament in South Korea.
Specifically, as Trump hinted at modernizing the U.S.-South Korea alliance through potential troop reductions or enhanced strategic flexibility, domestic skepticism about the U.S. nuclear umbrella has grown. This has led to increased public support for developing independent nuclear capabilities.
However, the authors challenge the common belief that nuclear-armed nations are safe from external threats. They argue that nuclear weapons have limited effectiveness in deterring conventional military conflicts and may unintentionally escalate tensions.
The paper presents the paradox of nuclear weapons, asserting that their extreme destructive power actually limits their deterrent effect in most conflicts.
For example, the likelihood of South Korea using nuclear weapons in response to North Korean drone or cyber attacks, or provocations involving trash-filled balloons, is extremely low in practical terms.
Some proponents argue that nuclear capabilities would give South Korea leverage to propose mutual nuclear disarmament to North Korea, potentially advancing the goal of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.
However, the paper warns that South Korea’s nuclear weapons development would be a lengthy process. During this time, it’s questionable whether North Korea, China, or Russia would remain passive. The authors caution that North Korea might attempt to sabotage South Korean nuclear facilities or even launch preemptive strikes, significantly escalating the risk of a nuclear arms race.
Moreover, the study argues that South Korea’s nuclear armament would inevitably heighten security tensions in Northeast Asia, exacerbating geopolitical conflicts between continental powers like China, Russia, and North Korea, and maritime powers such as the U.S., South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan.
South Korea faces numerous practical obstacles in pursuing nuclear armament. Technologically, it would need to establish reactors capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium and the corresponding reprocessing infrastructure. Given South Korea’s high population density, strong local opposition, and environmental concerns, constructing these facilities would be challenging.
Additionally, the paper emphasizes that South Korea would require approval from the U.S. administration and Congress to possess nuclear weapons, a move that could severely damage trust between the two allies.
In conclusion, the authors assert that discussions about South Korea’s nuclear armament offer very limited security benefits while likely incurring significant diplomatic costs in the international community. They stress that nuclear armament is not a cure-all solution for South Korea’s security challenges.
