North Korea’s recent test launches of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) equipped with cluster munitions reveal a strategic shift, analysts suggested on Thursday.
This move demonstrates Pyongyang’s confidence in its ability to compensate for its outdated air force and potentially secure early battlefield dominance on the Korean Peninsula without resorting to nuclear weapons. The assessment comes from 38 North, a North Korea-focused publication run by the U.S.-based Stimson Center, which analyzed the April 8 and 19 launches of the Hwasong-11a and Hwasong-11b missiles, respectively.
Cluster munitions, designed to disperse multiple submunitions over a wide area, offer an alternative to the traditional high-explosive warheads used in ballistic missiles.
According to 38 North, North Korea’s development of these weapons likely stems from its weak air force capabilities. The cluster munitions effectively serve as a substitute for conventional air force bombing missions, allowing for area denial and suppression of enemy defenses. Moreover, these weapons may enhance missile accuracy while potentially overwhelming missile defense systems.
During the Hwasong-11a test, North Korea claimed to have simultaneously struck an area of approximately 6.5-7 hectares (about 7-8 soccer fields). The Hwasong-11b test reportedly covered a larger area of about 12.5-13 hectares (about 15-16 soccer fields), with high-density impacts.
These launches align with North Korea’s stated goal of strengthening its strike capabilities against South Korea, as outlined in the 9th Workers’ Party Congress in February. Recent weeks have seen a flurry of missile tests, including SRBMs, cruise missiles, and anti-ship missiles, showcasing Pyongyang’s efforts to diversify its arsenal and increase operational readiness.
The focus on enhancing conventional missile capabilities may indicate North Korea’s desire to demonstrate war-fighting abilities less reliant on nuclear weapons. This dual-track strategy, improving both tactical nuclear and conventional forces, suggests Pyongyang aims to achieve battlefield superiority through high-density strikes without immediate nuclear escalation. The approach may also reflect the practical challenges of employing nuclear weapons against South Korea.
38 North’s analysis suggests that North Korea’s SRBM force is evolving to take on roles traditionally assigned to air forces, addressing a key weakness in its military structure given the assumed air superiority of U.S. and South Korean forces. The think tank also noted that North Korea may have been influenced by Iran’s recent use of multiple warheads to challenge missile defense systems, particularly those employed by Israel.
