“What We Want Are Partners, Not Protectorates”
This statement was made by Elbridge Colby, the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, while explaining America’s Asia strategy in Manila, Philippines, on Monday. He clarified that urging allied nations to increase their defense spending isn’t a sign of U.S. withdrawal, but rather a way to ensure the sustainability of alliances.
At first glance, this sounds promising. It suggests a shift from being a dependent protectorate to becoming an equal partner capable of self-defense. However, Colby’s vision of partners is more nuanced than it initially appears.
Allied nations must bolster their military capabilities and increase defense spending. At the same time, their military strength must align closely with the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. While they need to become stronger, this doesn’t necessarily translate to strategic independence.
Colby emphasized that the U.S. is not retreating from Asia. He stressed the importance of enhancing forward-deployed readiness and combat capabilities, as well as building a denial defense to prevent adversaries from quickly establishing military facts on the ground. This strategy aims to counter attempts to create the appearance that limited forceful actions have changed the overall situation. Colby likely had China’s approach to Taiwan and North Korea’s nuclear ambitions in mind when making these remarks.
The metrics for assessing alliance effectiveness focus on actual combat readiness, not the number of summits held or the grandeur of joint statements. He highlighted that capabilities such as force deployment, military preparedness, defense industrial base, and interoperability are crucial for real-world military operations.
In essence, Colby’s alliance theory envisions allies strong enough to stand on their own, yet closely integrated to fight alongside the U.S.
South Korea is no exception. During his visit to Seoul in January, Colby positively evaluated South Korea’s move toward assuming greater defense responsibilities. His comments were primarily interpreted as suggesting South Korea take on more responsibility for deterring North Korea while the U.S. focuses on countering China.
However, a closer examination of this logic reveals that Colby’s vision is more complex than it initially appears. It also raises a crucial question: if South Korea assumes more responsibility, will it gain more decision-making power?
Transitioning Wartime Operational Control: Are South Korea and U.S. on the Same Page?
The Lee Jae Myung administration is accelerating the transition of wartime operational control. The Ministry of National Defense announced its focus on completing the transition roadmap in the second half of this year. It plans to propose verifying the Future Combined Command’s Full Operational Capability (FOC) and determining the transition timeline during the South Korea-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM). Related evaluations will also take place during the Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) exercises starting on August 17.
For years, the transition of wartime operational control in South Korea has been seen as a restoration of military sovereignty through South Korean-led defense. This goal depends on the strength of the South Korean military.
However, viewed through the lens of Colby’s alliance theory, while there are areas where South Korean and U.S. interests align regarding the transition, it’s also clear that the two nations may have divergent objectives.
If the South Korean military leads the Future Combined Command and takes on more responsibility for addressing North Korea’s conventional threats, it will achieve the goal of South Korean-led defense. From the U.S. perspective, this aligns with their desire for allies to shoulder more of their own defense burden.
However, from the standpoint of restoring military sovereignty, the situation becomes more complex. It’s questionable whether South Korea’s strategic autonomy will truly increase just because its military leads more of the combined defense operations. Even after the transition, the South Korea-U.S. combined defense system will remain, and U.S. extended deterrence against North Korea’s nuclear threats will continue to be a cornerstone of South Korea’s security.
Colby emphasized integrating strong allies’ military capabilities with U.S. regional strategies rather than focusing on allies’ military independence. Consequently, the post-transition South Korea-U.S. alliance may present a paradox: the South Korean military may assume more operational responsibilities and grow stronger, yet it may need to align more closely with U.S. military preferences and strategies.
This raises critical questions about the role of U.S. forces in South Korea if tensions escalate in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea. To what extent can the South Korean military integrate with the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy? Put simply, if the U.S. calls for a military confrontation with China, what options will South Korea have?
Colby’s phrase partners, not protectorates is pivotal. Moving beyond protectorate status involves more than increased financial contributions. It means developing greater military capabilities and accepting more defense responsibilities and risks. It also implies making more crucial and frequent strategic decisions.
In light of this, South Korea’s push for the transition of wartime operational control must now incorporate broader perspectives and philosophies beyond just timing. It’s crucial to anticipate the additional responsibilities and decisions South Korea will face post-transition. We must carefully consider whether the partner Korea envisioned by the U.S. aligns with our concept of a leading Korea.
