North Korea is preparing to hold the 11th Congress of the Socialist Patriotic Youth League (Youth League) for the first time in five years. The regime has redefined the youth generation as the core strength of the state, fueling speculation on Tuesday that Kim Jong Un’s daughter, Ju Ae, may take on a prominent role during this event.
The party’s official newspaper, Rodong Sinmun, declared in a front-page editorial that the Youth League’s combat power is an integral part of national strength. Notably, Kim has, for the first time in history, defined the combat power of youth organizations as national strength, expanding the traditional concept beyond military, economic, and ideological power to include the organizational strength of youth.
This shift signifies a substantial elevation in the status of future generations. Ju Ae, previously viewed as a symbol of the future generation, is likely to solidify her position as a potential successor by leading the youth at this congress.
The 11th Congress of the Youth League, coinciding with its 80th anniversary, is expected to be a grand event, marking the first gathering since 2021.
Attention on Emergence of Future Generation Leader Ju Ae… Unlikely She Will be Directly Involved in the Youth Alliance
The newspaper highlighted major achievements, including the construction of Pyongyang Vanguard Street (2024) and the Sinuiju Greenhouse Farm (2026), involving 100,000 Youth League members. This emphasis underscores how youth mobilization has strengthened national power. North Korea propagates the idea that true life purpose is established in the most challenging places, portraying youth involvement in state projects as a form of voluntary contribution.
In this context, Ju Ae’s role as a symbol of the future generation is drawing significant attention. Since her public debut during the launch of the Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in 2022, Kim has been grooming her as a potential successor by including her in military, diplomatic, construction, and civilian affairs.
Notably, Ju Ae appeared at the completion ceremony of Vanguard Street, a project led by Youth League members, last May. Her presence at this congress could symbolize another connection between the future generation and the Baekdu bloodline.
However, given that the Youth League functions as an external organization promoting the regime’s ideology rather than an official state apparatus, it’s unlikely that Ju Ae will receive an official title within the league.
Park Won-gon, a professor of North Korean studies at Ewha Womans University, observed that Ju Ae has emerged as a symbolic figure from the start, accompanied by the future generation narrative. Emphasizing the Youth League serves to create political space for her.
However, he noted that the traditional North Korean succession model is built through positions in the party, government, and military, rather than through roles in external organizations like the Youth League.
Yang Moo-jin, a distinguished professor at the University of North Korean Studies, concurred, stating that while Ju Ae symbolizes the future generation, her status within the Baekdu bloodline makes it highly unlikely that she would hold a title in an external organization like the Youth League.
Amid a Crisis of Youth Disengagement, North Korea Tightens Control, With Ideological Management Emerging as a Core Task for the Youth
Analysts suggest that viewing this congress solely as a platform for succession overlooks the serious crisis of youth disengagement facing North Korea.
The emphasis on youth issues in Rodong Sinmun’s front-page editorial reflects the regime’s recognition of the need for stricter control over young people. The editorial warned that if the mental state of the youth collapses, it cannot recover from the consequences, designating ideological disengagement as a primary threat to regime stability.
Recent legislation, including the Anti-Reactionary Ideology and Culture Law (2020), the Youth Education Guarantee Law (2021), and the Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Law (2023), aligns with the characterization of youth organizations as a bulwark against ideological and cultural infiltration. This suggests an intention to utilize the Youth League not merely as a mass organization but as a comprehensive mechanism for ideological control.
Observers believe that the regime aims to establish a structure that positions the Youth League atop a legal framework encompassing punishment, education, and daily control, effectively reconfiguring the youth generation as a target for constant surveillance and mobilization.
Additionally, the regime contrasts youth in capitalist societies as individuals consumed by materialism, while portraying North Korean youth as selfless patriots who protect their homeland without compensation, aiming to boost their morale.
Professor Park Won-gon analyzed that the emphasis on the youth generation during Kim’s era stems from the low loyalty of the market generation and the influx of external information. He concluded that this generation, which values individual and market experiences over the state, poses a potential challenge to the regime.