As the U.S. approaches the November midterm elections (for both the House and Senate), it appears to be solely focused on pressuring its allies, particularly concerning South Korea’s deployment to the Strait of Hormuz and the implementation of a 350 billion USD investment in the U.S.
Meanwhile, the U.S. seems disinterested in discussing follow-up security consultations related to nuclear-powered submarines and revising the atomic energy agreement that South Korea anticipates, as well as the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON). Critics on Wednesday argue that President Donald Trump’s transactional diplomacy has become excessively one-sided.
U.S. Seeks Results Through Hormuz Deployment and Investment: Attempting to Offset Poor Economic Performance with Diplomacy?
According to a Reuters-Ipsos poll conducted from August 28-31, President Trump received his lowest approval rating of 33% since taking office last year, a significant drop from the 47% he enjoyed at the beginning of his term.
This is causing anxiety for President Trump and his administration, with the midterm elections just two months away. If the Republican Party loses in the midterms, they will not only lose momentum in governing but also make it difficult for Trump, with two years left in his term, to maintain party support.
According to a Fox News report on Tuesday, the economy is the top concern for American voters in this year’s midterm elections. However, it’s nearly impossible to resolve economic issues, which are difficult to show tangible results in the short term, within just two months.
This situation explains why the Trump administration, which boasted diplomatic achievements such as the North Korea-U.S. dialogue during its first term, has intensified its diplomatic pressure. The aim is to produce diplomatic results again and use them for the election. President Trump seems to view the U.S. investment issue as a victory to rectify unfair relationships and alleviate economic difficulties, while the Hormuz deployment issue is seen as a means to justify the Middle East war.
In this context, there’s a growing assessment that the Trump administration is urging South Korea to decide on investment and deployment issues by November. The South Korean government is also actively responding to U.S. demands for investment, such as the construction of the Encinitas gas combined cycle power plant in Texas, worth about 30 trillion KRW (about 224 million USD), and the construction of eight nuclear power plants. It has also sent a local survey team to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to examine deployment conditions.
Indefinite Consultations on Nuclear Submarines and Atomic Energy Agreement Revision; OPCON Transfer Target Year Setting Also Challenging
On the other hand, South Korea and the U.S. are making no progress in discussions on introducing Korean-style nuclear-powered submarines and expanding uranium enrichment and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing rights through the revision of the atomic energy agreement (security consultations).
The security consultations, originally scheduled to begin in January this year, barely held their first meeting in June. Since then, the U.S. has been refusing South Korea’s requests to resume consultations, citing U.S. investment as the reason. The South Korean government set a goal to cross the 70% mark in security consultations within this year, but it’s widely believed that it will be difficult to make further progress in consultations this year.
The South Korean government has recently notified the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of its intention to consult on the nuclear submarine project and has submitted necessary documents for a separate arrangement under Article 14 of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) in accordance with IAEA regulations. However, without progress in the South Korea-U.S. consultations on nuclear fuel procurement, which requires U.S. support, the nuclear submarine project will inevitably stagnate.
Discussions between South Korean and U.S. defense authorities on the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON), which were supposed to set a target year within this year, are also reported to be not proceeding smoothly. The South Korean government had set a goal to agree on the timing of OPCON transfer at the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) expected to be held in Washington, D.C. in November and report it to the presidents of both countries. However, in the current atmosphere, there are observations that the U.S. is likely to use this issue as a bargaining chip against South Korea, bundling it with other South Korea-U.S. issues.
As President Trump has expressed his intention to pursue dialogue with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, establishing a pre-coordination mechanism between South Korea and the U.S. in preparation for direct U.S.-North Korea negotiations has also become a task. However, this too appears difficult to discuss in depth at present.
The Flip Side of Transactional Diplomacy: When Urgent, Even Allies Become Means to an End
Trump’s transactional diplomacy has shown clear pros and cons. While unprecedented U.S. investments due to tariff threats have been a significant burden on the South Korean economy, it’s also clear that the opening for nuclear submarine introduction and atomic energy agreement revision would have been difficult to expect from any U.S. administration other than Trump’s.
However, as Trump finds himself in a tight spot due to the ill-conceived Middle East war and poor economic performance, critics argue that his transactional diplomacy is degenerating into unilateral diplomacy. This is evident in the U.S. demanding swift decisions from South Korea to align with its political schedule while not even providing a timeline for security issues requested by South Korea.
Some strongly criticize the U.S. for urging deployment to South Korea, a country with conscription, as showing no consideration for South Korean public sentiment. They even go as far as to say it’s tantamount to essentially conscripting South Korean youth for battlefields where the U.S. needs them.
Professor Ha Sang-eung of Sogang University’s Department of Political Science and Diplomacy said that in a situation where the war isn’t going as planned, this could be a move by the U.S. to quickly shift the burden of aftermath to its allies.
Professor Park Won-gon of Ewha Womans University also advised that combat deployment should be avoided as much as possible, and suggested that if deployment is to be made, it needs to strongly demand what it can get in return, such as nuclear submarines, revision of the atomic energy agreement, or OPCON.
Whether South Korea and the U.S. can reset the one-sided situation and resume discussions on major issues seems to depend on the upcoming announcement of the U.S. investment agreement and the South Korea-U.S. foreign ministers’ meeting during Foreign Minister Cho Hyun’s visit to the U.S. Minister Cho is expected to visit the U.S. as early as next week, or by September 18-19 at the latest, to have in-depth discussions with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio on the U.S. investment agreement and subsequent situations.