As President Donald Trump prepares for his visit to China at the end of this month, experts suggest that South Korea should also prepare for a potential phased denuclearization if talks between North Korea and the U.S. materialize.
If denuclearization negotiations occur, North Korea and the U.S. could initiate measures such as freezing North Korea’s nuclear program, suspending joint U.S.-South Korea military exercises, normalizing diplomatic relations, and partially lifting sanctions against North Korea. These actions directly impact South Korea’s security, underscoring the need for policymakers to strike an appropriate balance between engagement and pressure in their North Korea policy starting now.
A report titled, Prospects for Resuming North Korean Denuclearization Negotiations and Considerations, released on Monday by Senior Researcher Park Yong-han of the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) and two colleagues, reveals that North Korea simultaneously expresses hostility toward the U.S. and a favorable view of President Trump. This duality stems from North Korea’s need to solidify Kim Jong Un’s succession, produce additional nuclear weapons, and boost economic growth through improved relations with the U.S. and others to revive foreign trade.
While North Korea maintains cooperation with China and Russia, the report analyzes that these countries cannot fully replace the strategic value of the U.S. due to increasing uncertainties from the evolving Russia-Ukraine conflict and U.S.-China competition.
Park and his team emphasize that without normalized U.S.-North Korea relations, North Korea will struggle to engage with the international community through organizations, undermining Kim’s strategy to become a normal state. They also note that while comprehensive system openness may threaten the North Korean regime, improving bilateral relations can be viewed as a means to sustain the regime and its system long-term.
The persistent need to reduce North Korea’s nuclear missile capabilities threatening the U.S. mainland has been consistently raised. Additionally, President Trump’s use of language that could imply recognizing North Korea as a nuclear state increases the possibility of dialogue. Notably, the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Strategy (NDS) released after the start of Trump’s second term omit mentions of complete North Korean denuclearization, suggesting that if U.S.-North Korea dialogue occurs, it could evolve into broader denuclearization negotiations later.
The report conducted a Delphi survey involving 30 officials from government, research institutions, and universities, considering lessons from previous negotiations and the current situation on the Korean Peninsula. The findings project that formal denuclearization negotiations will likely commence in 2026, with a high probability of reaching an agreement after more than a year of talks, potentially in 2027 or later.
Initial discussions in the denuclearization negotiations are expected to focus on freezing North Korea’s nuclear weapons at their current level. The U.S. could negotiate the shutdown of North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear production facility and the dismantling of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In return, North Korea may demand the postponement of U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises, normalization of diplomatic relations, and easing of sanctions.
Based on previous negotiation outcomes and Delphi forecasts, the report suggests that the final agreement is likely to emerge within a goal area where both North Korea and the U.S. exhibit somewhat low policy preferences.
This scenario may involve North Korea initially implementing a phased approach with some regime guarantees while reducing the ICBM threat to the U.S., thereby enhancing U.S. negotiation incentives and strengthening deterrence against North Korea. However, it’s crucial to consider that this approach could potentially weaken the U.S.-South Korea joint defense readiness or limit South Korea’s role as a facilitator during negotiations.
The report emphasizes that South Korea should focus on limiting and delaying the acceleration of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities in response to potential shifts in U.S.-North Korea dialogue and denuclearization discourse. It also advises maintaining pressure on North Korea while adopting an engagement policy that could induce change.
Park and his colleagues suggest considering a shift in negotiation strategies from freezing to managing or dismantling nuclear capabilities. They propose an approach that outwardly resembles disarmament but fundamentally aims for denuclearization, allowing for an exchange of political justification and practical benefits. They also recommend strengthening the U.S.-South Korea Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) as a foundation for extended deterrence, compelling North Korea to confront the burdens associated with its nuclear weapons program.